Why was the Macedonian phalanx so effective in Alexander's time and so vulnerable against the Romans?
Why was the Macedonian phalanx so effective in Alexander's time and so vulnerable against the Romans?
The Macedonian phalanx wasn’t that vulnerable against the Romans. In fact, the Romans were not well-equipped to face the Macedonian phalanx in a fair, full-frontal fight.
Macedon
The Macedonian phalanx was so strong because it was an improvement on the already impressive Greek phalanx, which had performed well against lighter-armed armies like the Persians. The innovations of the Macedonian army, while they were exploited to their fullest extent by Alexander the Great, were put into place a generation earlier by Alexander’s father, Philip II.
Bust of Philip II of Macedon
Philip was a great innovator and wanted to raise Macedonia from a backwater regional power to hegemon of all Greece. In pursuit of this goal, he instituted several decisive reforms to Macedonian armies that made them superior to any army in Greece.
First, he changed the meta by greatly lengthening the spears of his hoplite warriors. The conventional meta had previously been to use spears of about 10 feet in length, along with a shield in the other hand. Philip gave his hoplites new spears that were closer to 15–20 feet in length. This spear was called the sarissa, and it allowed the Macedonians to outrange their enemies by several feet as well as applying more pressure with the heavier spears.
The Macedonian phalanx in action
The phalanx was just one part of the army that conquered half the known world. Philip knew Macedon’s greatest strength was its horsemen. The Greeks, as city-state dwellers, did not have riding cultures, and no prominent Greek city state other than Thebes had any cavalry worth mentioning. By contrast, the Macedonians had a long tradition of strong cavalry, and Philip exploited this strength to its fullest extent.
The second half of his military doctrine was the famed Macedonian cavalry, composed of some of the swiftest and most precise horsemen in the world. They would sweep around the enemy lines and smash into them from the flanks or the rear, crushing the enemy between the phalanx and the cavalry and causing a rout. While the strong phalanx pinned the enemy down, the cavalry would outmaneuver the enemy formation and end the battle.
The Macedonian cavalry fording the river at the Battle of the Granicus
Alexander’s Macedonian army was so strong on the battlefield that it is almost impossible to overstate. Imagine facing down a row of fifteen-foot-long spears that hopelessly outrange your weapons and have incredible striking power. Then imagine that there are dozens of them pointing at you, held by heavily armored and disciplined infantry in a tight, pretty much unbreakable formation. Finally, imagine that your ranks suddenly start collapsing from a lightning-fast cavalry strike.
This has been called by later historians as the “hammer and anvil” doctrine, and I can’t help but think it somewhat resembles the combined arms mobile warfare of a much later era in history. Its effectiveness was unquestionable. This was the army that destroyed the great Persians in numerous battles and conquered an empire stretching from Albania to India.
The Romans had an entirely different approach, a military evolution born from necessity.
Rome
The Roman military started off as a knockoff of Greek armies. The Romans fought in phalanx formation, used the spears and shields of Greek hoplites, and were heavily armored. Well, the rich ones, at least. From the beginning, wealth divisions were evident in the Roman army, as everyone supplied their own equipment, and poorer soldiers had to deal with inferior armor or armament. The core of the Roman army, though, was pretty much an imitation of the Greek phalanx.
Right around the same time that the Macedonians were innovating their Greek phalanxes, the Romans did the same. However, their goals were different, and thus their innovations were different.
The Romans opted for a complete rehaul of their military. They were in the midst of a series of wars with their stubborn enemies, the Samnites. When fighting them, they were forced to enter the hilly terrain of central Italy, where their phalanxes were slow, unmaneuverable, and easily ambushed by Samnite forces.
One crucial weakness of the phalanx is rough terrain, which will be an important point later. For the Romans’ purposes, though, the rough terrain meant that their tight formations were disrupted and exploited by Samnite attacks. Loss of cohesion in the phalanx destroyed its effectiveness. The Romans needed a more versatile army that could be flexible and responsive to changes in battle environment or conditions.
Map of Italy during the Samnite Wars
They created the manipular legion, which was based on Samnite battle tactics. Under this system, the primary weapon of the Romans became the sword, and shields became larger. Formations became more flexible and spaced out, although they could close together to form shield walls. This army was designed to cover the weaknesses of the phalanx without compromising too much of its strength.
The wealth and experience classes were more strictly defined. The army was divided into four groups: the velites: lighter scouts and skirmishers; the hastatii: young, less experienced, less armored, and taking the front line first; the principes: more experienced, more armored, and swapping with the hastatii on the front line; and the triarii: the oldest, most experienced, and most heavily armored soldiers, generally fighting to turn the tide of a losing battle.
Triarii were the only soldiers who continued to carry heavy spears. They were essentially the phalanx component that the Roman army retained for its power in frontal assault. The rest of the army, however, was optimized for fighting in all sorts of terrain in all directions, as opposed to the phalanx, which performed best on flat terrain and could not easily turn to face flank attacks.
Artist’s impression of a Roman triarius. Note that the shield is still larger than that of an equivalent Greek hoplite.
It was also during this period that the Romans adopted their trademark javelin, the pilum. Against the Macedonian phalanx, which had to sacrifice the large shield of the old Greek hoplites for long, two-handed spears and a smaller arm-strapped shield, the javelins were unexpected and devastating. A sacrifice of shield protection, which made sense when the range of the sarissa could compensate, proved inadvisable against javelins with even longer range.
The confrontations
These were the legions that faced the Macedonian-designed phalanxes of Pyrrhus of Epirus, who invaded Italy in the early 200s BCE. Contrary to expectations, the Romans held the front line against the Macedonian spears exceedingly well, bearing the Macedonian attack and only retreating after their scares with Pyrrhus’s elephants, which the Romans had never before seen.
Another thing that helped the Romans was morale and discipline. They managed to keep high morale and preserve the integrity of their formation despite being severely outranged in melee combat. Although the Romans were defeated in these battles, the Greeks suffered such heavy casualties that Pyrrhus was forced to retreat to Epirus and the term Pyrrhic victory forever bears his name.
Depiction of Romans vs Macedonians in battle
When push came to shove, however, the Macedonian phalanx proved itself superior. At the Battle of Magnesia in 191 BCE, the charge of the Seleucid phalanxes overwhelmed the Roman infantry, who were forced into a hasty fighting retreat as the long spears outranged their short swords. The battle was won when the Romans hit the Seleucid flanks hard and disrupted the formation, causing the attack to falter and allowing a counterattack to rout the dispersed phalanx.
At the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE, the Macedonian phalanx ran into its weakness of rough terrain. The unevenness of the ground resulted in gaps in the phalanx’s line, which the mobile and flexible Roman infantry units easily exploited to break up the phalanx, encircle individual Macedonian units, and destroy them. Their long spears were ineffective if they were circumvented and their formation broken.
Conclusion
The Romans were able to defeat the Macedonian phalanxes not because they were better at frontal assault. In the ancient world, I would not put any army over the Macedonians in such a full-frontal confrontation on flat ground. In cases when the Romans did fight the Macedonian phalanx head-on, their performance was either mediocre or poor. Despite the effective use of the pilum, the range and weight of the sarissa was often too powerful for the Roman infantry to bear, and just as a Greek phalanx would, they would have to fall back.
But the Romans usually won battles against the phalanx because of the lessons upon which they had built their army: the need for flexibility and maneuverability on the battlefield. Flank attacks and disrupting formations were devastatingly effective on the inflexible phalanx formations, which could be easily overwhelmed if their cohesion fell apart.
The Romans were also generally better-supplied, had stronger naval forces, and were better at prosecuting their wars than the Macedonian Greeks, who were often divided and not nearly as efficient with organizing their resistance. Those reasons, more so than battlefield performance, were what decided that Rome would rule over Greece.
The last day of Corinth, Tony Robert-Fleury, 1870
One reason: COMBINED ARMS.
There is no perfect weapon. There never has been and probably never will be. Each weapon has strengths and weaknesses. Some more than others, but all have certain weaknesses that can be exploited.
Let’s make a simple exercise:
- I have a spear, holding it with two hands. It is a very strong weapon: it has reach and is very fast and accurate. How do you beat me? Just use a bow. I have no defense against an arrow, and a bow has longer range.
- Now you have a bow and arrow, how can I beat you? I will pick a sword and shield. The shield will protect me from your arrows while I get close enough, and your bow will be useless once you are within sword’s reach.
- I have a sword and shield now, how can you beat me? You take a spear and attack me. The spear is faster and has more reach than the sword. My shield will provide me protection, sure, but only for so long. An experienced spearman can defeat an experienced swordsman any day.
- You have a spear now, what do I do? Well, I can just pick a bow…
And then the cycle repeats. This is just a simple example, but it illustrates the larger problem: weapons have weaknesses.
So, what happened with the Macedonian phalanx?
The phalanx was a phenomenal weapon. With its 6 to 7 meters long spears (called sarissas) they probably had the longest reach in melee combat in the ancient world. This meant that the Macedonian phalanx was virtually untouchable.
(The sarissas raised in the back rows were used to deflect enemy missiles.)
However, in order to work properly, it required to stay in formation. If the phalanx stood in order, it was nigh invincible. If order was broken, it was very easily destroyed, for the sarissas were too long to be wielded as individual weapons.
This is where the combined armes kick in.
Alexander was a brilliant strategist and a master tactician. He was perfectly aware of the weaknesses of the phalanx, which is why he never used it alone.
So, first you have the phalanx, with each phalangite armed with a sarissa and a small shield that hang from the shoulder, so that both hands could be used for the sarissa:
Along with the phalanx you had:
- Hypaspists (heavy infantry):
- Traditional greek allies (heavy infantry):
- Peltasts (light infantry):
- Companion cavalry (heavy cavalry, and arguably the greatest cavalry force in the ancient world):
- Thessalian cavalry (heavy cavalry):
All of these unites supported each other in a perfect use of combined arms warfare:
- The Macedonian phalanx held the center of the battle. It’s job was to hold the line and keep the enemy engaged and in a fixed position.
- The Hypaspists and Greek allies protected the flanks of the phalanx. Their job was to protect the phalanx from the sides, thus covering the rigidity of the formation.
- The Peltasts provided range support. Their job was to harass the enemy, to goad him to attack and to cause casualties from a distance.
- And the cavalry maneuvered around the field to destroy the army that was fixed in place by the phalanx.
THIS is why the Macedonian phalanx was so successful. Because both Alexander and Phillip II understood the concept of combined arms and managed to create a whole system of warfare that effectively used the strength of different arms while covering the weakenesses of each other.
So what happened when the Macedonian phalanx faced the Romans?
They kept the phalanx, and in excellent shape. But all the other arms were lost or weakened… particularly the cavalry. The Companion Cavalry was crucial for the Macedonian army. Alexander and Phillip both expressed that the phalanx was the anvil and the companion cavalry was the hammer, and they both had to work in unison.
Let’s look at one of the most important defeats of the Phalanx: the Battle of Cynoscephalae.
The phalanx was not properly formed, true. Only half of it was properly deployed. But the half that was deployed was actually beating the Romans handily. The Roman legion was helpless against the Macedonian phalanx.
BUT…
The flanks of the phalanx were exposed, and there was no heavy infantry to protect them. And the cavalry, which was both small and weak, could not properly protect the phalanx.
This situation played straight into the Roman Legion’s strength, because that unit, one of its main strengths, was its flexibility. That strength played straight into the Phalanx’s weakness, and since there were no other arms to protect the Phalanx, the Legion won the day… and the war.
SO, IN CONCLUSION:
The Roman Legion was so effective against the Macedonian Phalanx because the latter was improperly used. It was used alone, when it was designed as a part of a combined arms army.
Therefore, as it usually happens, the problem were not the soldiers or their fighting style, but the commanders, who failed to use each strength properly.
The manipular Roman legion was designed to do two things:
- Fight in the confinement and irregular conditions of the Italian Hills
- Defeat the Phalanx
During Alexander’s time, the Romans fought in the phalanx formation and was equip in a similar fashion. Roman Hoplite(the “disc” cuirass is specific to Italy):
The Romans fought fellow Italians, Greco-Italians colonialist, Celts, Etruscans, etc. regularly and the phalanx served them until…the Samnites. The Samnites were hill people:
The hills and mountains were unsuitable for long spears and large formations of men. The phalanx formation did not serve the Romans against the Samnites and the Romans lost battles. The Romans adopted certain Samnite techniques.
The Romans dropped the phalanx formation completely. Besides dropping the formation, the Romans divided the roles of the legionary while developing a new formation. The new formation was called the manipular(handful) formation. After years of warfare in the Italian hills, a distinctly different looking Roman soldier emerged from the Samnite Wars. New Roman legionaries:
Left: Hastati(60-120)-Regular young infantry man, front line trooper. They use throwing javelins with special bending tips, pilum. The breast plate is probably a “hand me down” from when his grandfather used it as a hoplite.
Left Center:Velites(60-120)-Poor young skirmisher/screener, carries 5 to 7 light javelins(not pilum) and a short sword, not part of the regular fight, provides general help behind the front lines during battle. Gather behind the triarrii after heavy fight begins. Carry away wounded, bring in extra spears, etc. The job is apprenticeship to becoming a hastati.
Center Right: Triarii(30-60)-Oldest, most experienced, best equip, generally richest soldier. He uses a spear, not a javelin. He is a remnant of the phalanx and would only engage in battle if the principes and hastati had failed.
Right: Principes(60-120). Called the first line. Older, more experienced versions of a hastati. Same equipment but better(mail instead of chest plate, etc.). They form up behind hastati; oddly, the first line was the second line. No one has even explained how one goes from hastati to principes; it could be just affording the gear.
Superficially, these were the obvious changes:
- A lightly armed young soldier was given all tasks which required speed and maneuverability.
- The shield is taller and narrower and covers more of the body; this may have been an adoption from the Celt or the Samnites or the Romans making their equipment match the new fighting method. Second, the “argive” grip for the shield is dropped in favor of a center grip. This shield not only covers more of the body, it has far more mobile. Third, the Romans used the shield as an offensive weapon.
- Only the triari retained the heavy spear but all his other gear is the same as the principes, just better.
- The short sword(from Spain) became a primary weapon.
- The Roman adopted mail (from Gaul via the Samnites) as their main armor. It covered more of the body.
- Greaves were worn on the left shin, or not at all. This strongly suggests a very big change in fighting stance. The legionary stance would have been the left leg forward, right leg slightly back. This is a stance suited best for javelin throwing or sword fighting:
- The Romans traded in the spear for two heavy javelins. This allowed the legionary to outrange the hoplite. The pilum design is a subject for another day.
So, when Pyrrhus of Epirus shows up in Italy with his highly honed phalanx, he was not facing an Italian phalanx but a completely new formation. Even so, the Romans initially lost at a 2:1 ratio at the battles of Hercaclea and Asculum.
Many analysts at the time claim the new formation did well against the phalanx and Macedonian success was due to their war elephants; a tactic never seen by Romans before. It apparently invoked panic among the legionaries.
The Roman countered with an “anti-elephant” war wagon.
However, losses among Pyrrhus’ elite Macedonian hoplites had been very high and most phalanx commanders that had come to Italy with him, were dead.
The Romans developed new techniques to crack the phalanx with their new formation. The first thing the Romans learned was to break the formation by using javelins and uneven territory. The idea was to create gaps in the wall of spears and allow the legionaries to get in close.
Second, the Roman took advantage of the “one direction” nature of thenphalanx. While almost unassailable from the front, the phalanx formation was not suited to turning; thus attacking the corners can prove decisive. If a group of legionaries got past the spears at a corner, the phalanx spearmen are almost helpless.
Thus, let the new big shields bear the brunt in the middle while the edges of the phalanx is pummeled with heavy javelins at the edges. The “argive” grip of the hoplite means the hoplite had a limited range of motion to use his shield for protection. With velites bringing in new pilum to the Hastati; the phalanx’s edges would have problems during the best of times.
By 275 BC, when Pyrrhus fought his last battle in Italy, the phalanx and manipular legion fought on equal terms.
As the Romans fought, they developed improved tactics and better ways to use the formation. The manipular formation evolved and continued to improve, the phalanx did not.
After 200 BC, legions regularly defeated phalanx formations on Greek soil.
Post Script:
I have had many comments about Alexander’s Phalanx and the manipular formation. We cannot know but I judge that unlikely. However, while Alexander the Great was doing his thing in East, his uncle, another Alexander(of Epirus) was fighting Italians:
He had some success against the Southern Italian Greek phalanx and formations of the Southern Italians. So when his grandson, Pyrrhrus came over and thought he would have similar luck, it was not an unrealistic expectation.
Epirus and Macedonia were culturally very similar and shared combat techniques:
So, this claim that Alexander’s Macedonian and Pyrrhus’ Epirite phalanxes were very different is implausible.
TL;DR: The Macedonian phalanx had always been vulnerable, but Alexander made sure this wouldn’t get fatally exploited by his enemies.
Later generals leading phalanx-based armies proved less competent, while the Roman armies became better at dealing with them.
On the vulnerability of phalanx formations
The phalanx had always been like the proverbial hedgehog facing the fox, trying to optimise one aspect at the expense of overall versatility. As such, unsupported phalanxes had always fared poorly, as exemplified by engagements like the battle of Sphacteria and the battle of Lechaeum, where unsupported hoplites were slaughtered by enemies who employed lighter troops.
For this reason, a recurring theme in the evolution of phalanx warfare from the Persian Wars to Philip’s and Alexander’s times was making the phalanx more agile as well as increasingly provide support by other units like skirmishers and cavalry.
On Alexander’s use of the phalanx
Because of this evolution, as well as the lengthening of the main weapon, phalanxes became better at offence while remaining extremely strong at frontal defence. Commanders like Philip and Alexander recognised this new role of the phalanx and made it the basis of a successful combined arms tactical playbook. Their highly professional phalangites were disciplined and drilled to manoeuvres that were advanced, like fake retreats and oblique advances
Philip’s and Alexander’s main tactic was for the phalanx to advance and pin the enemy centre, while other units tried to exploit weaknesses in the opposing formation. At the same time, there were units like the peltasts and hypaspists, whose main responsibility was to cover the flanks of the pezetairoi (foot companions) as Macedonian phalangite units were known at the time.
No matter how much care was taken to alleviate the phalanx’s drawbacks, Alexander’s aggressiveness was so demanding that there were situations when the phalanx got exposed.
According to Arrian’s The Anabasis of Alexander (Book II - Chapter X):
But the Grecian mercenaries serving under Darius attacked the Macedonians at the point where they saw their phalanx especially disordered. For the Macedonian phalanx had been broken and disjoined towards the right wing; because Alexander had charged into the river with eagerness, and engaging in a hand-to-hand conflict was already driving back the Persians posted there; but the Macedonians in the centre did not execute their task with equal speed; and finding many parts of the bank steep and precipitous, they were unable to preserve the front of the phalanx in the same line. Here then the struggle was desperate; the aim of the Grecian mercenaries of Darius being to push the Macedonians back into the river, and regain the victory, though their own forces were already flying; the aim of the Macedonians being not to fall short of Alexander's good-fortune, which was already manifest, and not to tarnish the glory of the phalanx, which up to that time had been commonly asserted to be invincible.
Arrian was a Roman General who wrote many centuries after the battle, but his military experience and excellent sources allowed him to discern what went wrong: a phalanx advancing unsupported over uneven terrain is a recipe for disaster.
Alexander broke the Persian left by personally leading first the hypaspists and then his Companion cavalry, so the phalanx’s inability to beat the Greek mercenaries at the centre didn’t prove decisive.
This pattern of Alexander pushing the phalanx to its limits by asking it to attack, but still getting away with over-exposing it is a recurring theme in his battles. One of the best features of Alexander as a general was to know when he could take risks. For example, at the battle of Jaxartes, Alexander brought his heavy infantry last, to avoid exposing them to the horse nomads cavalry and horse archers.
On the comparisons of Hellenistic Greek and Roman armies
Alexander didn’t live long enough to campaign in Italy, but even if he had, he might not have faced the manipular legions that later gained much fame by conquering his homeland, because the relevant reforms were introduced in 290BC.
That said, the first act in the phalanx vs legion conflicts involved none other but Pyrrhus, Alexander’s second cousin. Pyrrhus campaigns in Italy, involved a series of close fought battles that demonstrated his tactical brilliance as well as his lack of strategic acumen and diplomatic skills, at least compared to his brilliant cousin. Still, he faced the Romans in three very close and bloody battles, and it was that aspect that ended up losing him the war.
The fist battle of the Pyrrhic War was the battle of Heraclea. Since it was the first time that a manipular Roman army faced a Hellenistic army, it can provide some unique insights about the effect of tactical advances that took place later in time.
The most interesting things about the battle are two:
- Neither the phalanx nor the legions were able to win a head-on fight against each other, so it ended up being decided by cavalry and elephants.
- The compositions of both armies had significant differences to past and future incarnations. More specifically this is the generally accepted list of units and their strengths.
Notably, both armies were short in light infantry and Pyrrhus had war elephants.
On how the Romans adapted to fighting against Hellenistic armies
The Romans’ primary concern after Pyrrhus departure from Italy wasn’t the phalanx or the Greeks, but Hannibal and his Carthaginian armies.
Some of the most catastrophic defeats that they suffered throughout their history taught them a valuable lesson: even the best heavy infantry is doomed when the opponent is a better tactician that uses a variety of units to the best of their strengths.
Soon, Romans started relying more on their support units, for example defeating Carthage by gaining the services of Numidian cavalry. So when it was time to face Philip V of Macedon at the battle of Cynoscephalae, they had equal numbers but also a very versatile army around their legions that proved decisive.
Just have a look at the critical phase of the battle. Half of Philip’s army never quite formed and its flanks were not secure by supporting units, while the other half actually drove the Romans back.
The Romans on the other hand used their cavalry, elephants, light infantry and legions in a combined arms approach. Coupled with luck and superior initiative, they won a battle which is frequently used as an example of the overall inferiority of the phalanx.
In my opinion however, this battle just shows how the Romans got the mix right as opposed to Cannae. Philip V on the other hand paid the price for his many failures as a commander.
This is what Polybius had to say about the situation at the Macedonian left flank:
The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight.
Polybius, Histories
Catching the enemy in marching formation is the equivalent of ambushing them, something which the Romans themselves suffered on many occasions.
On the decline of Hellenistic armies
Hellenistic armies, especially viewed through the lens of Roman history, are often presented as a degenerate version of Alexander’s pure, “perfect” army. The truth couldn’t be further from the truth.
Unlike (and thanks to) Alexander, the most powerful of the Diadochi didn’t lack resources and could recruit the best of the best. Military innovation during the early Hellenistic times was unprecedented, with one power introducing Cataphracts, the other setting up a war elephant breeding program and a third investing heavily in siege engines. Even smaller states played with light infantry units such thureophoroi and thorakitai, while specialist mercenaries like Tarantine cavalry and Rhodian slingers remained much in demand.
It is true however that during the later part of the Hellenistic period, many states became increasingly reliant on their phalanx units, whose equipment and training also changed for the worse. Problem is, the phalanx was not the only unit whose quality deteriorated due to either lack of resources or adequate training and poor morale. Yet, commanders kept using the phalanx aggressively, as an offensive unit capable of achieving a breakthrough, without recognising this was better achieved with proper combined arms tactics.
Take for example the famed battle of Pydna. Its main act was a fairly predictable affair: the phalanx slaughters the legion head on, but the disciplined Romans retreat to rough terrain and the phalanx becomes disrupted.
As discussed previously, this had happened to Alexander’s phalanx on more than one occasion, but at Pydna king Perseus was hardly worthy of his predecessor. Either due to incompetence, cowardice or treason, his companion cavalry failed to attack at the decisive moment and instead left the infantry to be slaughtered by the Romans.
There are however some counter-examples, like the battle of Magnesia. There, the Seleucid phalanx proved worthy of its Alexandrian predecessor, but despite its impressive formation of infantry squares, it was let down by its commander’s insistence on the use of scythed chariots and war elephants which proved catastrophic.
Another case against the phalanx is its (final) performance during the Mithridatic wars. However, as most revivals of past tactics, it wasn’t accompanied by building an experienced and disciplined army around it. How could Archelaos succeed in using scythed chariots when the much better Seleucid army failed?
If we are to believe Plutarch’s dubious report, the Roman legions were successful in countering the Pontic sarissas by using their hands and gladii. For the legion to defeat a phalanx head on, it must have been quite the incompetent phalanx.
On Roman superiority over the Greeks
It is definitely an exaggeration to attribute the Roman dominance to a simplistic view of superiority of legions over phalanxes. As discussed. Rome got a significant advantage over its opponents by building a highly disciplined, experienced and tactically versatile army, but that wouldn’t have been possible if the Romans didn’t aggressively engage in expansion and diplomacy.
Every war that Rome fought brought them new allies, while their existing allies proved fairly dependable. From Aetolian cavalry at Cynoscephalae to Eumenes’ slingers and archers at Magnesia, Roman allies added an extra level of difficulty when dealing with Rome. Even on the occasion of a Roman defeat, like for example at the battle of Callinicus, their local allies were extremely important as they allowed the Romans to operate in what would otherwise be hostile territory.
It is therefore my view that Rome had won most wars before setting foot on the battlefield. Roman diplomacy dictated where a battle would be fought and that the Roman legions would be adequately supported by locals. As the winning record started to pile up in favour of the Romans, the Greek started treating them as invincible on the battlefield even if they were clearly not.
The last element that I want to address is Luck, that elusive goddess named Tyche or Fortuna, which Polybius mentions in his histories. Studying battles in isolation, it’s easy to view certain developments as pure luck favouring the Romans, like for example the accidental encounter at Cynoscephalae. But if one looks closer, they wouldn’t fail to notice that the Romans always stacked the deck in their favour, making sure that the first enemy mistake would be fatal.
So what does it matter if the Romans didn’t face their Greek opponents at their strongest? After all, the Greek weakness was something that the Romans themselves cultivated carefully over centuries, even having a kingdom bequeathed to them when king Attalos of Pergamos died childless.
Which bring us to the conclusion: the phalanx was so vulnerable against the Romans because its commanders didn’t learn the lessons that their Roman counterparts paid much attention to, as “taught” to them by Alexander, Pyrrhus and Hannibal.
The effectiveness of the Macedonian phalanx during Alexander the Great's time and its vulnerability against the Romans can be attributed to several key factors:
Effectiveness of the Macedonian Phalanx
- Tactical Formation: The Macedonian phalanx was a dense formation of infantry armed with long spears (sarissas), which could reach up to 18 feet. This created a formidable wall of spear points that was difficult for enemy infantry to penetrate.
- Training and Discipline: Macedonian soldiers, known as phalangites, were highly trained and disciplined. They could execute complex maneuvers and maintain formation under pressure, allowing them to operate effectively in battle.
- Support from Cavalry: Alexander effectively integrated cavalry with the phalanx, using heavy cavalry (the Companion Cavalry) to exploit breaches in enemy lines and flank opponents, which complemented the phalanx's strengths.
- Leadership and Strategy: Alexander's tactical genius and ability to adapt to different battlefield conditions maximized the strengths of the phalanx, allowing him to achieve significant victories against various foes, including the Persians.
Vulnerability Against the Romans
- Tactical Evolution: By the time of the Roman confrontations, military tactics had evolved. Roman legions utilized more flexible formations and manipular tactics, allowing them to adapt to different situations and exploit weaknesses in the rigid phalanx structure.
- Mobility and Flexibility: Roman soldiers (legionaries) were trained to fight in smaller units that could maneuver more easily than the large, unwieldy phalanx. This flexibility allowed Romans to encircle or outflank Macedonian formations.
- Use of Artillery: The Romans effectively employed siege engines and artillery (like ballistae and onagers) to disrupt the formations of the phalanx from a distance, reducing its effectiveness before a melee could occur.
- Combat Experience: Roman soldiers had extensive experience fighting against various types of infantry formations, including the phalanx. This experience allowed them to develop strategies specifically designed to counter phalanx tactics.
- Psychological Factors: As the Romans expanded their territory, they faced and adapted to many different enemy tactics, leading to a greater understanding of how to counter formations like the phalanx. This adaptability contributed to their success against Macedonian forces.
In summary, while the Macedonian phalanx was highly effective in the context of Alexander's campaigns due to its organization, training, and leadership, it became vulnerable against the Romans as military tactics evolved, emphasizing flexibility and adaptability in combat.
Becuse the conflict wasn’t about Macedonian phalanx versus Manipular legion.
It was about Greek warfare versus Roman warfare.
Greeks at war
To Greeks warfare was something you did, if you won that was great but if you lost that wasn’t great but at least you got to go home and life was still good. Ancient Greeks never were a powerful martial culture, Philip II of Macedon and his son Alexander had legendary exploits but they were an exception to the rule. Greeks knew how to fight and wouldn’t shy from it but it was one of the many things they did.
But Romans? Roman national psyche was that they might lose a battle, they might lose an army, they might lose ten armies, but the war had to be won. If that meant sending all your children to die for Rome and then dying yourself, then it meant that. Rome (at the time) was unwilling to accept anything less than a victory.
That’s what gave them the edge to take out the Macedonian phalanxes. They were still highly effective formations although decrepit by the time they faced the Romans. A proper Alexandrian army was made of three formations, Phalangites were an important part but equally important were the horsemen that stuck at enemy flanks and rears. That was largely abandoned and forgotten by the sucecssor states, the sarissa phalanx was good enough for most jobs and they had better things to do than this “war” thing anyway.
It worked, until they faced a culture that really didn’t.
I’ve already answered a question where I cover this topic already, so I’ll simply copy and paste my answer here with the link to the original answer. Jack Zhang's answer to What myth about historical warfare really bothers you?
The truth was that while one a 1 to 1 basis the Romans had the advantage in flexibility, the phalanx was never intended to be used alone when it was invented by Philip II, father of the famed Alexander the Great. It was part of a combined arms doctrine that was later abandoned due to its cost and complexity.
Philip II
Philip II spent his youth as a hostage in Illyria and Thebes. Unlike the modern connotations associated with hostages, hostages during antiquity were exchanged in diplomatic interactions and were kept as honored guests to be used as collateral if one party violates agreed upon terms. Macedon at this point had suffered numerous invasions from Dardania, a kingdom of Thracians and Illyrians. Philip II took the throne after the deaths of his two older brothers; one of these brothers, Perdiccas III, was personally killed by the king of Dardania. Philip II was treated well during his time as a hostage, and received a proper education. One of the things he learned was the Greek fighting style of hoplite phalanxes.
Soldiers called hoplites were armed with large circular shields called hoplons, a long 6′ to 12′ spear, and a short sword like an akinakes or a xiphos for a sidearm. These soldiers would form a tight knit unit with a forward facing shield wall. Due to their large shields and tight formation, they were unbreakable from the front, especially against poorly disciplined enemies who didn’t have coherent formations of their own. The downside was that because of their tight formation and poor communications during the heat of battle, it was incredibly difficult for the phalanx to turn as one to face a flanking attack. The individual soldiers could hold their own in a fight but the definitive edge of hoplites was their ability to fight as a unit; when attacked from the flanks individual soldiers could turn to face the threat but without the mutual support of their entire phalanx it was incredibly easy to break a phalanx from the sides and rear. When Philip II took power he overhauled the Macedonian army.
The backbone of the new Macedonian army was a sarissa phalanx of soldiers called phalangites. They formed the pezhetairoi, meaning foot companions. Unlike hoplites, phalangites used a two handed pike called a sarissa over 13′ long, sometimes stretching up to 18′.
This allowed the sarissa phalanx to have multiple rows of spearheads in front of its soldiers. The length of the sarissa gave the soldiers an amazing amount of leverage because simply by moving one end of the sarissa a tiny amount would result in a large displacement in the spearhead on the other end. An enemy soldier armed with a shield and a short sword or spear has to make larger movements to protect themselves from the pikes that could very quickly change the point of attack from extremity to extremity. The individual phalangite had a telamon shield carried on the upper left arm; these were far smaller than the hoplon shields used by hoplites but did not need the entire left arm to wield. The distance between the front most row of spears and the front most soldiers as well as the multiple rows of spearheads pointing forwards made it virtually impossible for enemy soldiers to close the distance to attack with more conventional swords and spears, let alone cavalry. Individually, a pikeman is quite vulnerable as an enemy infantry soldiers needs to only get past the spearhead before becoming untouchable as the pikeman cannot pull back the pike far enough to attack someone within arms reach. This means that the sarissa phalanx was more vulnerable to being struck from the flanks than the hoplon phalanx; if the enemy infantry were fast enough they could close to within the minimum effective range of the sarissa before the phalangite can turn to face the threat. This was exacerbated by the fact that the foot companions while (forced) professional soldiers were entirely levied from the peasantry. The Greek hoplites were a mix of levied soldiers and aristocratic soldiers who could afford better armor; those pictures you see of Spartans clad out in iron and bronze armor represent the Spartiates, the spartan elite who could afford such equipment. The shear cost of training and equipping the entire foot companion force made it impossible to afford decent armor for these soldiers. So far it seems that the sarissa phalanx had its ups and downs compared to the hoplite phalanx right? Well, many of those apparent trade offs become outright advantages when we add in how they were employed.
The enemy that the sarissa phalanx was specifically meant to defeat were the traditional hoplite phalanxes. Greek warfare was often about agreed upon set piece battles where opposing phalanxes would attack each other head on. Philip II needed to only ensure that his phalanx was deployed in a sufficiently wide line to prevent the enemy phalanx from enveloping his. However, the biggest threat to Macedon were the Illyrians and Thracians. These soldiers fought with unconventional strategies. For starters there were no agreed upon chivalristic fights; war was war and if fighting dirty meant winning then the gloves come off. They made extensive use of peltasts and other skirmishers; using rough terrain, loose formations, and light equipment, the Thracians and Illyrians would use hit and run tactics, avoiding melee with the slow moving Greek phalanxes while also constantly pelting the phalanx with javelins. Once the hoplites were exhausted and their cohesion began to break down, these light infantry would then engage in melee combat with the corners of the phalanx, where a break through would allow them to envelop the entire phalanx and attack from their vulnerable flanks. The pezhetairoi were broken up into 256 man strong syntagmas. Due to the extensive drilling, entire syntagmas could turn near simultaneously to face a threat from another direction. Such coordination on this scale was not possible with other professional armies of the time. In fact, Alexander the Great would use these drills to intimidate the enemy; during his campaign against the Illyrians he drilled his army in front of the Illyrians who pulled back in the face of such discipline. I will elaborate more on this later.
But Philip II knew that these formations were only as good as the men who led them and a incompetent commander attacked from the flank could see the entire pezhetairoi line collapse. To properly guard his flanks, Philip created the hypaspists units, or shield bearers. The shield bearers were veteran soldiers taken from the pezhetairoi. They were equipped like traditional hoplites, but fought differently; the hypaspists arranged themselves in a loose formation. This allowed them to easily turn as an entire unit, even after the enemy already strikes its flanks. Thanks to their shorter spears and larger shields, individual soldiers were far more capable on their own if they lacked the mutual support of their unit due to an enemy flanking attack. They could quickly get into a traditional hoplite style phalanx when attacking an enemy head on, albeit without the same frontal damage potential as the sarissa phalanx. During battle, the shield bearers would be placed along the flanks of the foot companions to protect the sarissa phalanx from flanking attacks by light infantry and cavalry. The hypaspists would also be the ones selected to conduct fighting using unconventional tactics or anything outside of a simple set piece battle. Fighting in adverse terrain, sneaking into an enemy camp at night, or scaling a cliff to launch a flanking attack would almost always be left to the shield bearers. Their loose formation allowed them to quickly close the distance against light infantry while their large shields protected them from projectiles.
The lightly armored and small shield bearing foot companions were also vulnerable to skirmishers. For this reason, Philip gave the job of screening against enemy skirmishers to three units: Macedonian and allied skirmishers, allied light infantry, and cavalry. Macedonian archers were not exactly anything special, but their allied Cretan counterparts were considered the best archers in all of the Hellenic world. The rugged hillsides of their home islands were perfect terrain for driving off enemy armies with archers placed in elevated shooting positions. The rugged terrain also led to the Cretans having exceptional stamina for traversing the landscape, which Alexander would later exploit by using the Cretans as long distance foot runners for delivering messages.
Agrianian light infantry formed the core of Macedonian light infantry. Like the Cretans, the Agrianians were native to a region with very rugged terrain and large hills. The Agrianians were exceptionally mobile and their stamina allowed them to quickly seize hillsides ahead of an enemy advance, or run down enemy peltasts. Their speed was exceptional, and armed with three javelins and a spear, they also doubled as a formidable skirmisher force.
Macedon’s cavalry force was quite formidable. Adopting the wedge formation used by Illyrian and Thracian cavalry, the Macedonian companion cavalry would accompany the general to the right of the right most shield bearers. The wedge allows the cavalry leader to lead his entire unit in a series of turning maneuvers without uttering a single word. Instead of a straight forward charge that would become a disorganized thrawl of horseman, the companions simply had to keep an eye on the person in front of them. This individual would follow the person in front of them, and so on, until the front most individuals were following their cavalry commander who directed his cavalry wedge to charge into the weakest portions of the enemy line.
Filling a similar role on the Macedonian left were the Thessalian cavalry. These were arguably the equal if not the betters of the companions. The Thessalian cavalry formed a rhomboid formation.
This allowed the Thessalians to lead complicated maneuvers charging into an enemy formation and then do the same thing while pulling back, all the while maintaining a cohesive formation. What made the Thessalians so deadly was their ability to repeatedly cycle charge over and over again into weakspots in the enemy line. The Thessalians wore a distinctive purple cloak that would flap when the horses were charging full tilt, resembling the wings of a bird. Each Thessalian cavalryman carried a short spear that could be thrown or used as a lance, and a longer spear meant purely for usage as a lance during a charge.
The Thessalians and Companions were the heavy shock cavalry but lighter cavalry from other Greek regions would be employed as scouts and skirmishers. Macedonian prodromoi, Paeonian light cavalry, and Thracian light cavalry were kept on the flanks of the Companions and Thessalians. These cavalrymen were armed with javelins and swords, not suitable for charging into lines of infantry, but perfect for skirmishing or if need be fighting in a support role alongside better armed cavalry. During the heat of battle, the Thessalians and Companions would charge into the enemy lines while the light cavalry would throw their javelins at enemy skirmishers and infantry. They would also fight along the flanks in melee combat if the Companions or Thessalians engaged enemy cavalry.
The classic tactic you will hear nonstop is the hammer and anvil. Initially, light cavalry and archers would rush forward and drive off enemy skirmishers. Light infantry would take their places on suitable grounds along the flanks to either harass the enemy or hold these positions against enemy light infantry. This shielded the foot companions and shield bearers from enemy light infantry attempting a flanking attack; the shield bearers could hold their own against flanking light infantry but were better utilized when kept in reserve in case elite enemy cavalry or heavy infantry attempted the same maneuver. The foot companions would advance, using a line or slanted line formation (usually) and engage the enemy infantry head on; the shield bearers committed themselves minimally. They needed to quickly deploy themselves to shield the sarissa phalanx if need be; as a result, they were sort of fighting and sort of kept in reserve, never over committing to the melee but not waiting in the rear either. The Thessalians on the left flank and the Companions on the right would charge down the their respective sides, skirting around the main enemy line to attack from the sides or rear. The light cavalry would form up along the outer flanks of these wedges, keeping enemy skirmishers at bay. If the enemy had cavalry, the heavy Macedonian cavalry would deal with them first before charging into the flanks of the enemy infantry, routing them. From here on, the shield bearers, light infantry, and cavalry would run down the fleeing enemy soldiers, killing or capturing as many as possible.
This was the standard battle tactic of the day during the reign of Philip. It was perfect for fighting on even ground, and if the Macedonians had to fight on uneven terrain, they could employ the cavalry, light infantry, skirmishers, and shield bearers in a leading role.
Roman Maniple
The Romans initially used a hoplite style phalanx until like the Macedonians they ran into a problem with mobile light infantry and skirmishers on rough terrain. The Samnite people would routinely beat back Roman armies, forcing the Romans to adopt the maniple system, a formation based off of the ones the Samnites used. The Romans used a quincunx formation. The soldiers were arranged into maniples of 120 soldiers which would be arranged like a checkerboard.
The front row of maniples were the hastati, the most inexperienced soldiers, armed with a gladius and a scutum shield. Later, these soldiers would also carry a pilum. Each soldier had ample space to maneuver, allowing the formation to not be broken up by terrain while also allowing them to spread out further than a phalanx could. The middle row were the principes. These were the core of the manipular legion and included more experienced soldiers who could afford better armor (the lorica hamata). These soldiers fought in more or less the same manner as the hastati. Behind them in the final row were the triarii, the most experienced soldiers in the legion. Unlike the soldiers of the principe and hastati, the triarii fought like hoplite phalanxes, with each triarii maniple arranging themselves into a tight square and forward facing shield wall. Like hoplites, the triarii used a large shield (scutum) and a spear, with a shortword (gladius) as a sidearm. In front of the maniples were loosely arranged skirmishers called velites. These were basically peltasts, and had next to no protection save for a small shield. During a battle, they would be used as fodder ahead of the maniples, absorbing enemy projectiles or cavalry charges, while doing their best to inflict casualties with their javelins. After the velites expended their ammunition (or their lives) the front maniples would advance, throw their own javelins, and charge the enemy. The combination of the javelin volleys as well as the impetus of the maniple’s charge would often break sections of the Samnites lines, which soon resulted in the entire enemy army fleeing. If the enemy withstood the charge or charged themselves, the hastati would pull back and form a single formation with the principe. Together, these two sections were to do the lionshare of the fighting. If the fighting was desperate, they would call upon the triarii. Their experience and tight phalanx formation would hopefully break the enemy line which at this point had fully committed and had lost any advantage of terrain and mobility by being stuck in a sustained melee where their loose formation was a weakness the triarii could exploit.
Above in order from left to right: hastati, velite, triarii, principe
Combat Record of the Macedonians In Their Prime
At the battle of Pelium, Alexander the Great marched on the city of Pelium where the Dardanian king Cleitus was encamped with an army. Cleitus had allied himself with Glaucias, king of the Taulantians, in a revolt against Macedonian hegemony. Pelium was located in a plain surrounded on three sides by high hills and a river on the fourth side. A narrow stretch of flat ground lie between one of the hills and the river, serving as the only suitable ground to march a column through; it was so narrow, only four soldiers marching abreast could cross through it.
Cleitus positioned himself with his army in entrenched positions on the hillside overlooking the pathway; the heavy vegetation blocked Cleitus’ army from sight. Alexander sent his shield bearers and cavalry ahead to seize the hillside, to ensure his phalanx could cross unmolested. Upon engaging with the Macedonians, Cleitus was driven from the hill and forced to retreat to the city of Pelium. The Macedonian army entered the plains and approached the city. Glaucias arrived with his army the next day, who quickly seized all of the surrounding hilltops. Low on provisions, Alexander sent Philotas with the baggage train and some cavalry to forage for food. Glaucias marched to intercept Philotas, and Alexander took his shield bearers, Aggrianian light infantry, archers, and 400 cavalrymen to aid the foraging party. Glaucias thought that Alexander was advancing with his entire army, and withdrew to the hilltops, wanting a better position to fight the entire Macedonian army. However Alexander simply pulled back to his camp with his foraging party. Without food and trapped on all sides, the Macedonians needed to pull back as fighting uphill conventionally was near suicide. Alexander assembled his foot companions into a 120 deep square and marched them forward. Not a single soldier uttered a word so as to better hear Alexander’s orders. The soldiers in the front held their sarissas upright; upon receiving the order, they angled their pikes to the right, and then to the left, in perfect unison, creating a loud swishing sound that could be heard for some distance. Amazingly enough, despite the phalanx’s reputation for being slow to turn, the phalanx rushed forward and split into two. They then pivoted and turned to the right, and then to the left. After rearranging his entire army several times over, he formed his phalanx into a wedge.This formation then charged the hill to the Macedonian left, without any mention of the formation being broken. The Taulantians on the hilltop withdrew immediately. When the Macedonians captured this position, they let out a war cry and clanged their sarissas against their shields. Illyrians on nearby ridges began to withdraw at this sight. When Alexander observed a hill that had not been abandoned by the Illyrians he sent his Companion cavalry; half of which would dismount upon nearing the enemy position and fight as infantry while the other half would remain mounted, presumably performing a small scale hammer and anvil. They never got the chance, as the enemy fled before them.
The Macedonian archers and Aggrianians soon occupied the hilltops, while the foot companions, led by the shield bearers, withdrew across the river, forming their phalanx on the other side. Now alone with his skirmishers and Companions, the Taulantian soldiers who had fled before returned to attack the retreating Macedonians. Alexander charged the enemy with his Companions and the foot companions raised their battle cry, feigning an attempt to cross back through the river. Seeing the entire Macedonian army seemingly advancing towards them, the Taulantians pulled back. Alexander and the skirmishers rushed for the river, and the Companion cavalry crossed before the Taulantians returned. Alexander’s siege engines had been set up and along with the archers who were mid stream began shooting at the Taulantians, once again forcing them to pull back. When Alexander returned, he found the majority of the Taulantian and Dardanian armies encamped outside Pelium, without ramparts, walls, trenches, or even sentries. That night, the shield bearers, Aggrianians, and archers crossed the river ahead of the rest of the army. The archers and Aggrianians attacked the encampment. Those that were awake heard the commotion and formed a phalanx. But the aggrianians in their swiftness charged into the flanks of the phalanx, and broke it soon afterwards. Many more Illyrians were slayed in their beds, while others were cut down attempting to flee. Both Cleitus and Glaucias fled back to the mountains, their army in shambles.
At the Battle of the Hydapsus, Alexander and his army faced the army of King Porus on the opposite side of the Hydapsus river. Alexander saw that he likely had a cavalry advantage, but the Indian war elephants would likely spook the horses, who would refuse to fight or even approach such large animals. Alexander left Craterus with a portion of the foot companions, a squadron of Companion cavalry, and 5000 allied Indian cavalry.
The rest of the army followed Alexander upstream to attempt a night time crossing while the forces left behind would light fires and march up and down the river, letting out war cries as they did so; since these actions had been done for the past couple of days, the soldiers of Porus grew desensitized to such sights. The war cries gave the impression that the Macedonians were about to attempt a crossing everywhere which Porus began to ignore. The noise and the numerous camp fires gave the impression that the Macedonians were still in place, feigning a crossing when Alexander had in fact left with most of his army to try the real thing. Porus had sent cavalry patrols up and down the river, one of which caught Alexander right after he crossed. This patrol comprised of chariots and cavalry led by Porus’ son. The Greek cavalry was divided into squadrons which allowed for more flexibility and micromanagement by subordinate commanders, who quickly routed the enemy and killed Porus’ son. Alexander marched south quickly assembled his army before Porus. Alexander sent his mercenary Persian horse archers to harass the enemy chariots and elephants, before charging the Indian left flank with his Companion cavalry; Alexander’s general Coenus led another cavalry contingent and swung around the Indian right flank, striking the Indian left from behind.The phalanx attacked the elephants. The foot companions would surround individual elephants and prod them from all sides with their sarissas, but the elephants would charge and penetrate the phalanx, trampling those that stood in front of them. In spite of this, neither the Indian infantry nor cavalry were able to rush the gaps and get past the pikes to engage the foot companions in close melee. Note that the Indian infantry filled the gaps between the elephants, so they were well poised to do so.The Macedonians quickly rallied and reformed, keeping the enemy infantry from being able to push their advantage and break their phalanx. The skirmishers followed close behind the phalanx, throwing javelins that killed the elephant drivers. Injured and without guidance, the elephants trampled their own line of cavalry and infantry as they fled. With all his cavalry behind the Indian line, Alexander ordered his infantry to form as tight a phalanx as possible and advanced forward, killing any who stood in their path while the cavalry killed those trying to flee. Craterus soon crossed with the remainder of Alexander’s army, and slaughtered those who managed to escape.Combat Record of the Macedonians Against the Romans
The two most infamous examples that I will call upon are the Battle of Pydna and the Battle of Cynoscephalae
At the Battle of Cynoscephalae, King Philip V of Macedon and Consul Flaminius were encamped on opposite sides of a hill. Philip sent a small force to occupy the hilltops, as a heavy mist prevented either side from being able to see very far in any direction, making an ambush from the hill particularly deadly. Flaminius sent a scouting force of Aetolian cavalry and light infantry to the hill which clashed with the Macedonian force occupying the hill top. Both sides sent messengers to their respective camps. Philip dispatched the Companion cavalry, Thessalian cavalry, and mercenary light infantry who quickly pushed back the Aetolians. At the same time, both the Macedonians and Romans assembled their heavy infantry. As the Macedonian cavalry pushed the Roman scouting force to the base of the hill, their momentum slowed. Philip, encouraged by reports of his cavalry's success advanced with only half of his foot companions while the others were still assembling under the general Nicanor. When he reached the summit of the hill, Philip saw that the Roman heavy infantry were advancing, and pushing back the relief force. Not wanting to lose his initial progress, Philip ordered his phalangites forward. His light infantry and cavalry pulled back and formed up on his right flank. They charged down hill and pushed back the Roman legionaries. However, half of the foot companions had not even reached the hill yet, let alone form up into a phalanx. Flaminius sent his reserves charging up the hill, which included 20 war elephants, and caught the remaining half of the footman unprepared. Without a cohesive formation and terrified by the charging animals, the Macedonian left routed. Twenty maniples of the Roman reserve force then ran back down the hill, slamming into the rear of the Macedonian right, who up until this point had been winning their engagement. The Macedonians were unable to turn quickly enough to face such an onslaught. The Macedonian foot companions raised their pikes in surrender, only to be slaughtered by the Romans.
At the Battle of Pydna, King Perseus of Macedon and Consul Aemilius faced off near the town of Pydna. The Macedonian infantry formed up into a single line, with light infantry along the flanks. Perseus had his Companion cavalry situation on the Macedonian right while mercenary light cavalry was placed on the Macedonian left. The Macedonians advanced, and quickly pushed the Roman infantry back.
However, the Romans eventually retreated over rough ground and the Macedonians struggled to maintain their formation; this was exacerbated by different performances of the phalangites at different parts of the phalanx. Some were eager to maintain the pressure and charged forward while some slowed as they crested low mounds. Eventually, gaps opened in the phalanx and the Romans charged into those gaps. Sections of the phalanx soon found Roman legionarii having slipped past their pikes from the front and were now being engaged from the sides. Being reduced to fighting with their inferior shields and short swords, the phalanx began to rout.
An elite corps of 3000 soldiers, probably shield bearers, fought to the last man.Analysis
So what happened in the span of around 200 years that led to the downfall of the Macedonians? To start with, the Diodochi Wars greatly weakened and depleted the man power of Macedon. The constant strife led to the treasuries often being depleted. To keep on fighting, the kings who ruled Macedon after Alexander cut costs in two ways:
The first was the duration of the levy for Macedon’s army, and the second was the amount of time spent training these soldiers. Instead of having a standing army of levied soldiers who were trained to a professional level and kept on for a set period of time, the later Macedonian armies were levied during times of need and dismissed afterwards. Being levied in times of need, the later Macedonian soldiers were not receiving the same amount of initial training when compared to Philip II’s or Alexander’s army; Philip II and Alexander drilled their army constantly in their down time when not on campaign. After winning a battle, those battle hardened men would be kept on for the next major encounter, and could share their experience with newly recruited soldiers. Later Macedonian armies used soldiers who had never seen battle before, and then dismissed them afterwards if they won, ensuring the next conflict would be fought with equally inexperienced men. Perseus thought that:
he was under the necessity of standing his ground there in front of Pydna and risking a battle, or else of scattering his army about among the cities and so awaiting the issue of the war.
The later Macedonian army was no where near as well trained or experienced as those of Philip II or Alexander the Great. Polybius notes the inability for the Macedonians to form their line or turn to face a flanking attack during the Battle of Cynoscephalae and yet when Alexander fought in front of Pelium his entire phalanx practiced drills where they would all turn about to face a new direction in unison; Alexander’s foot companions charged into hilly terrain, using a wedge formation. The wedge compensated for the phalanx’s weaknesses. If any part of the wedge was broken up by terrain and the enemy tried to press themselves into those gaps, they would simply be caught by the sarissas of soldiers advancing further back in the wedge. As mentioned during the Battle of the Hydapsus, the phalanx was penetrated by Indian war elephants, but the Macedonians neither broke nor was their phalanx cut to pieces by infantry who engaged these gaps. The Macedonians quickly reformed, forming a relatively even line which kept both the elephants and Indian infantry in check. The proficiency of Alexander’s soldiers was far in advance of those of Perseus and Philip V who struggled to form a simple uniform line when advancing into infantry. It was most likely this inexperience that caused the Macedonian foot companions to flee when charged by elephants and the Thessalian and Companion cavalry be stopped by Aetolian light cavalry at Cynoscephalae.
Poor leadership was also chief among the reasons for the poor performance of later Macedonian armies. Perseus’ companion cavalry never attacked during the battle of Pydna, even though they were in the optimal position to do so. In fact, it is a matter of debate whether Perseus participated at all. Polybius (according to Plutarch) asserts that:
as soon as the battle began, played the coward and rode back to the city, under the pretense of making a sacrifice to Heracles, a god who does not accept cowardly sacrifices from cowards, nor accomplish their unnatural prayers.
If you couldn’t tell, Polybius didn’t think too highly of Perseus. However, a man named Poseidonius makes a counter claim:
it was not out of cowardice nor, nor with the excuse of the sacrifice, that the king went away, but because on that day before the battle began a horse had kicked him on the leg. He says further that in the battle, although he was of wretched plight, and although his friends tried to deter him, the king ordered a pack-horse to be brought to him, mounted it, and joined his troops in the phalanx without a breastplate; and that among the missiles of every sort which were flying on all sides, a javelin made entirely of iron smote him, not touching him with his point, indeed, but coursing along his left side with an oblique stroke, and the force of its passage was such that it tore his tunic and made a blood red bruise upon his flesh, the mark of which remained for a long time.
Either way, the Companion cavalry could have engaged with or without Perseus personally leading them, and yet they didn’t. A charge into the rear would have likely routed the Roman infantry as such a maneuver did at the Battle of the Trebia River. Philip V split his phalanx in two and didn't even bother assembling them into a cohesive formation until they reached the top of the hill. Some might argue that this was because the phalanx could not form on the hillside terrain or would advance too slowly; I would simply redirect them back to my earlier point about troop proficiency. But there was no reason to attack with half a phalanx while leaving the left flank and center completely exposed. There were no shield bearers or cavalry guarding the Macedonian left. Alexander never engaged the main enemy force with just his cavalry or with his infantry still forming. Even at the battle of Hydapsus where Alexander crossed with only a portion of his army, he waited for his infantry to form up before attacking Porus. Philip V also waited to hear of the success of the cavalry before marching his foot companions up the hill. Whenever Alexander sent ahead his cavalry, it was never to fight alone until something happened that would spur the use of the rest of army, but always with other units marching off immediately behind them. Had Philip V sent his army as soon as he heard of the initial skirmish he likely could have assembled his entire phalanx in time or simply withdraw his forces to more preferable grounds. Also note that Alexander used skirmishers to cover the advance of his infantry on rough terrain, while Philip V simply had these units form on the wings; they could have been useful in impeding the advance of the Roman infantry and elephants to buy time for the entire phalanx to assemble.
By the time of Philip V and especially during the time of Perseus, the phalanx was the primary combatant arm of the Macedonian army, fighting set piece battles with opponents at agreed upon positions, just as the traditional Greeks did. This abandoned the combined arms doctrine installed by Philip II, where shield bearers, light infantry, and skirmishers were just as if not more important, the latter being the case in mountain warfare. The cavalry was the critical striking arm yet later Macedonian Kings would often fail to utilize the Companion and Thessalian cavalry to strike their opponents in the rear, using them to skirmish with the enemy cavalry or not engaging them altogether.
Alexander the Great fought off armies who were far superior at flanking attacks with massed cavalry than the Romans were with manoeuvring on foot or with measly cavalry forces, but his successors lost Macedon because of the loss of competency on all fronts.
Note:
You might notice that many of the footnotes reference the same websites. This is because these are archived scannings of books, and the different links link to different pages.
Further Reading (on top of the literature referenced in the footnotes): A History of Macedonia
Footnotes
There were several factors that came into play.
Perhaps most notably, the Phalanx of Phillip/Alexander differed in several key aspects from the one utilised by later generals.
The kingdoms which formed following the death of Alexander and the fracturing of his empire found themselves facing no foreign foes, as the only possible threat to their realms were in fact other Successor kingdoms.
The battles between them turned into essentially clashes of Phalanxes, and as such the Phalanx evolved, in order to better reflect this new reality of war.
The formations were made heavier and deeper, the length of the pikes increased, complementary troops (absolutely vital to the successes of Alexander’s army), were neglected, and sound and innovative tactics became increasingly rare.
It was combined arms tactics, as much as the Phalanx itself, that contributed to Alexander’s many victories, and that required careful coordination between the pikemen, cavalry, and skirmishers. While the phalanx held the enemy in place, covered by skirmishers and its flanks protected by complementary troops, the cavalry would wheel around the enemy’s back and deliver the crushing blow.
Later generals however essentially used the phalanx as a steamroller, a massive body of men whose advance was essentially unstoppable; The Macedonian phalanx was never defeated frontally, baring engagements with other phalanxes. Provided it could maintain formation and protect its flanks, there was simply nothing an enemy force could do about it, as a frontal attack was effectively suicide.
What made the Romans different, was that their formations could withstand the pressure from the phalanx far longer than other troop types; Long enough in fact for the phalanx to begin to lose its cohesion, especially if drawn onto rough terrain. The Roman manipular system allowed for troops at the front to be easily replaced or reinforced by fresh troops from the rear.
The new phalanx was essentially a one-trick pony, and its maneuverability (already one of the weaker points of the original Macedonian phalanx) was additionally compromised. These weaknesses were not apparent while the Successor kingdoms fought each other, but became glaringly obvious when facing Roman armies.
Additionally, the command talent of the Successor generals would for the most part fail to even come close to that of Alexander or Phillip.
The quality of their enlisted men had dropped somewhat as well; The army of Alexander was composed of thousands of battle hardened veterans, ruthlessly drilled by Phillip, and who had fought countless campaigns under him. Though Successor armies were often composed of high quality troops, there was simply no way for them to reach the level of excellence and expertise that Phillip’s army had enjoyed.
Another important factor was the available manpower.
The Successor realms ruled over vast areas populated mostly by non-Greek populations, and only Greeks were considered worthy enough of serving in the Phalanx (the one exception was Ptolemaic Egypt following a certain point; This would cause a great deal of trouble for the kingdom in later years). As such, these realms always suffered manpower shortages. One lost battle could result in their manpower reserves being crippled for a whole generation.
Rome on the other hand controlled Italy, one of the most fertile regions in the world, which sustained a massive, and mostly homogeneous population. Rome would be able to stay in a fight, even after losing hundreds of thousands of men, as they had done during the Second Punic war.
Finally, Rome enjoyed a far greater level of cohesion as a political entity than either one of the Successor kingdoms. It did not have to deal with revolts from native non-Greek populations, or with constant civil wars between claimants to the throne, or rival Successor kingdoms; Rome in fact often served as a mediator in these conflicts.
I will emphasise only one aspect of this problem. Macedonian military was not the same in the time of Romans and in Alexanders time. Alexander used combined arms system much more. He did not utilize only one type of infantry. And his cavalry was also a very important part of the army, again tactically combined with infantry. The famous phalanx was used to pin down the opponent, not necessarily to destroy them.
If confronted with Roman maniples the Macedonian phalanx will lose if not on a perfect terrain for phalanx deployment. But if combined arms is used, anything can happen. Legion has developed into versatile unit so it was more useful, but Macedonian phalanx can be better if used properly.
You are actually comparing two different things when you describe the Macedonian Phalanx.
The one used by Alexander was part of a very flexible and mobile army. The phalanx itself doesn’t have to be terribly flexible, so long as the rest of the army can adapt and strike the enemy where it matters; the pikemen play only one crucial role in a battle.
It should also be known that the way the Romans fought by comparison was basically so-called Phalanx 2.0; the Romans fought in a far more flexible infantry line, as their lacked the sort of decisive cavalry arm as that of Alexander’s Macedon. Had Alexander engaged a Republican army comprised of two-four legions, the use of cavalry alone gives the former a critical edge- mobility decides where the fight would be, and while the legionaries might have some initial advantages against a pike phalanx, the maneuverability of the cavalry would severely affect their ability to respond to sudden attacks. This was precisely why the Romans were defeated at both Carrhae and Cannae: cavalry envelopment effectively dealt a fatal blow to the Roman armies involved.
Sp why was the pike phalanx so effective in one instance and not in another? It has nothing to do with the phalanx, but the cavalry. Give either army good cavalry forces and they can almost guarantee victory. They let you scout, they let you relay messages and battle orders, they can chase fleeing troops, and they can run around closing escape routes or flank the main force. Without cavalry you fight the enemy with none of those advantages.
Grossly oversimplified explanation: The phalanx was most effective in a combined arms setting working in tandem with light infantry and cavalry. Alexander used the phalanx as the anvil against which the hammer of his cavalry crushed the enemy. By Roman times the cavalry was less effective and the phalanx was the Macedonian arm of decision. Being a less flexible formation, the phalanx was vulnerable to flank attack by the more mobile Roman formations.
Why was the Macedonian phalanx so effective in Alexander's time and so vulnerable against the Romans?
Many of the other answers talk about tactics, but only one begins to mention strategy and logistics
There is an old saying that “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk strategy.” I usually extend this to “Idiots talk technology, amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk strategy, and experts talk logistics.”
The Romans won wars because they fucked like bunnies. When you have a huge family that runs to six, seven, eight, or even more sons, plus an unknown number of daughters, well, that is a huge pool of potential recruits to draw from. If Primus joins the Velites at age 16, and marches away to war, he likely has younger brothers of age 14, 12, 10, and so on.
Lets say that Primus survives for several years, and gets promoted to Hastati at age 20. By that time, two of his younger brothers are old enough to join the Velites. Now, perhaps the army of which Primus is a member gets defeated in a tragic, decisive slaughter. Perhaps at the hands of Pyrris, or in the battle Canae. Well, two of his brothers can sign up right away to avenge him, and he still has more younger brothers who will be able to soon.
I have another answer where I go into the biology of why Roman families were so big, but the short version is that it was because the western half of the middle third of Italy was perfect for growing wheat, and so all Romans, and importantly Roman women, ate a lot of carbs.
The other issue is the decline of Greek armies. Simply put, none of the “Diadochoi” (the various Generals who made themselves Kings of different parts of Alexander’s empire after his death, and their descendants) were as smart as Alexander, or as rich as him.
There is a saying, quoted by Thucydides and attributed to one of the Kings of Sparta that “War is not so much a matter of arms, as of money.” Alexander was rich enough to pay a lot of professional soldiers to do no productive work, and spend all of their time training for war, when they weren’t fighting. Using a 21′ long Sarissa is a difficult skill, and anyone who doesn’t practice at it diligently will not be good at it. But Alexander’s standing army didn’t only contain Hoplites (some modern writers have created the non-historical name of “Phalangite” to distinguish the Hoplites of Alexander’s time from those of previous eras, I trust that you readers are smart enough to understand that the Hoplite of Alexander’s time was equipped very differently than the Hoplite of, for example, the Peloponesian War.), but also Hypsasts, and heavy and light cavalry. Alexander’s battle tactics relied on a combined-arms approach that utilized all of these troops types, and therefore his strategic planning was focused on recruiting, training, equipping, and supplying all four troops types and getting all of them to the place where he would want to fight.
The Diadochoi neglected Hypsasts, and both types of cavalry, spending most of their resources on Hoplites, and not much else. They also skimped on training, meaning that their Hoplites were inferior to those of previous times.
So, when the Roman Maniples finally faced that armies of the Diadochoi, they weren’t going up against armies of the same quality as Alexander’s.
But even then, it was the ability of the Roman Republic to just keep replacing lost armies that made much more difference than anything about the quality of the troops on either side, or any advantages or disadvantages of their equipment and tactics.
Finally, to take the battle of Kunokephalie (most modern English speakers follow the Roman tradition, and call this place Cynoscephalae) as one example: the Romans cheated. Ok, there is no such thing as cheating in war, only doing what it takes to win. But the Romans brought Elephants to an infantry fight.
One other answer to this question mentions that battle, but I believe that he drew the wrong conclusion from it.
Both halves of the Phalanx were able to form up correctly, at least according to the sources that I’ve read. Claims to the contrary contradict that source. But, as I’ve implied above, Philip V’s army totally lacked heavy cavalry, and had only very few light cavalry. They also seem to have lacked any Hypsasts. But even so, the Greeks were kicking the Roman’s butts, until the Roman general sent the Elephants in. No infantry formation, no matter how effective, can stay together when Elephants are rampaging through it. I’m not sure what would have been able to stop the Elephants, maybe Peltasts, maybe heavy cavalry, but either way, Philip V didn’t have either.
Once the Roman elephants had disrupted and pushed back the Greek phalanx, then a cohort peeled off and hit the other half of the Greek phalanx in the rear.
Not only would Peltasts have (possibly) had a chance of neutralizing the elephants, but it would have been the job of Hypsasts to guard the flanks/rear of the Hoplites from just the kind of break-through attack that the Roman infantry used.
So, it was the poor strategic decision of Philip V to only recruit Hoplites that left him tactically handicapped when the time for battle arrived. Although, even more than that, it was the unfortunate economic situation that left him too poor to recruit a proper combined-arms force that really doomed him.
“War is not so much a matter of arms, as it is of money.”
-Archidamus II, King of Sparta (probably)
By the time the Romans rose, the Hellinistic world was in decline: multiple smaller kingdoms spawned what once had been the Macedonian kingdom. Romans had no real contender.
Ancient Greek kingdoms and states had been constantly fighting each other whilst Romans were the new uprising power.
To answer your question: Alexander’s Armies, 200 years before the decline of the Hellinistic era used the phalanx effectively. By the time Romans rose to power they had been working on the Roman manipular formation.
The phalanx and the Roman formation met in battle a few times with mixed results:
- Pyrhhic wars and the Invasion of Italy where even though the phalanx did win most encounters it was at such a great cost (hence the phrase Phhyric victory) and eventually Phhyrus lost.
- The battle of Cynoscephalae where the Romans fought Philip V; The Roman maniples proved a lot more flexible and mobile than the phalanx unit, and the Romans won the battle
- The battle of Pydna; even though the phalanx proved more power and broke Roman lines, effectively the Romans proved once again more flexible and mobile. Whereas the phalanx was powerful it was stiff, slower and not suited for the Romans, and this proved to be a big disadvantage.
Ultimately the Romans as the emerging super power had devised and evolved warfare, whereas the Greeks at a decline had failed to do so.
For reference: a phalanx was made of 16 battalions of 16 files, each numbering 256 men. It was commanded by the most experienced soldiers with the most inexperienced often at the front, and organised based on the origin of the soldiers. It predominantly used spears or spear-like weapons such as sarissas and pikes. It was the weakest on the rear and right. It was used to hold the enemy in their place, while the cavalry broke through enemy lines and did it’s job.
In comparison, a Roman maniple had multiple lines ranging from least experienced at the front to most experienced at the back for as many rows as the soldiers allowed, but most often 40 men wide. They used armour, short swords and shields. It favoured close range combat and one-on-one fighting, with the rear rows often throwing spears. As such, it was focused on manoeuvrability, mobility and individual fighting.
Phillip and Alexander’s phalanx was very versatile. The used the long spears, on occasion hoplite spears and even just javelins depending on what the situation called for. Plus there were two other essential elements the hypaspists who were an elite hinge linking thecogsksnx with the strike force charge at home companion cavalry. Alexander used his companions rather like Napoleon used his guard cavalry. The phalanx pinned the enemy center. The hypaspists deployed on the phalanx flank and stretched the enemy line. Then the companions would strike at the weakest point of the enemy line going for the eleventh jugular. Alexander’s army was a veteran force that Phillip had designed, led on victorious campaigns in Greece. They were very very good. The Hellenistic successors did not pay enough attention to the rise of Rome. The legions were specifically designed to destroy the phalanx. The large shield negated the phalanx itself. The pilum was heavy enough to not be deflected by the raised spears of the rear ranks of the phalanx which were designed to deflect and break the impact of javelins and arrows. The legions that invaded Greece and the Seleucid empire were a picked force of 25 legions experienced over the 20 years length of the second Punic war. They too were very very good. Maybe the most experienced veteran legions that Rome ever produced. They had more experience than Julius Caesar’s Gallic War legions .
A phalanx was effective long after Roman times. It was decisive in Swiss service into the modern era - partly because the Swiss defended defiles with mountains on their flanks. A phalanx that faces its enemy and does not break essentially cannot be defeated in the era before modern projectile weapons. To the extent it is vulnerable, it is vulnerable on its flanks or in rear. This creates the possibility of defeat by maneuver - something Romans were good at. But if you place your phalanx as the Swiss did - good luck trying to maneuver around it.
The Macedonian phalanx in Alexander’s time was supplemented by various support units that allowed it to be incredibly effective. The Macedonian phalanx had units elite Companion cavalry and elite infantry on the sides. The job of the phalanx was to hold the main portion of the enemy infantry in place, whilst the elite Companion cavalry and infantry broke through the flanks, swung around, and outflanked the main portion of the enemy troops. Moreover, Alexander fought the low quality light infantry of the Persians, which were unable to stand against the sheer weight of the phalanx. The Romans had disciplined heavy infantry that was far more flexible and could easily outflank the rigid phalanx on a rugged terrain. Plus, when the Romans fought Macedonia, it was no longer the powerful entity that was formed during Alexander’s time, and did not have the elite Companion cavalry that made the Macedonian army formidable.
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